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Abstract. As much of the academic discussion on electronic voting fo-
cuses on in person voting and Internet voting technologies, the ongoing
digitalization of another part of the electoral process is easily overlooked:
systems that aid the collection of signatures to recognize parties as legal
entities and/or to endorse them to appear on the ballot. In March 2014,
after the Digital Party Endorsement Act [2] was passed to permit the use
of digital solutions to implement party endorsements, Denmark’s Min-
istry of Economic Affairs and Interior (OIM) launched a tendering and
procurement process for such a system in June 2014. The contract was
signed in September 2014. In this paper, we report on our experiences
with this process.
According to Danish election law, any citizen who has the right to vote in an
election can endorse a new party for said election. The eligibility to vote implies
the eligibility to endorse.
Since the Digital Party Endorsement Act was enacted in 2014, the Ministry
of Economic Affairs and the Interior (OIM) is now allowed to use computer sys-
tems to collect and maintain party endorsements with the mandate to approve
or reject prospective parties. These decisions may be based solely on the content
of the digital database, storing all endorsements. The Act also shifts the respon-
sibility for checking the validity of the endorsements from the municipal level to
OIM. Based on the new authority granted by the Act, the Ministry has commis-
sioned a digital endorsement system called Digital Vælger Erklæringer (DVE)
that follows closely the traditional way of collecting such endorsements. Instead
of collecting personal ID numbers (CPR) and physical signatures, prospective
parties must now collect digital signatures (using the Denmark’s NemID system)
through an online computer system that is run by OIM. More information about
the design of DVE can be found on the DVE homepage3.
In general, the current version of the Act follows in many aspects and to
varying degree the best practices laid out in the Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)
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5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on standards for e-voting [1].
This already is an indication on the tight relationship between endorsement
collection and e-voting systems:
Prospective parties are candidates, endorsers are voters, signatures are bal-
lots. The main difference between the two is the open-endedness of the collection
process (which may be on-going for up to three years). The Act stipulates re-
quirements for the integrity of the result and the secrecy of the endorsements,
but stops short of mentioning verifiability. In general, the current version of the
Act is quite explicit on process, but quite tacit on technology.
After the Act passed, OIM immediately commenced with the procurement
process, in part, because OIM was newly tasked with verifying the validity of all
endorsements nationwide, which was a significant change from common practice.
OIM is responsible for verifying the legitimacy of each and every endorsement
and also that every endorser has endorsed one and only one prospective party.
Without computer support, this is a rather monotonous, error-prone, and tedious
job. Also OIM simply lacks resources to administer this task manually.
The digitization of party endorsements is much more than replacing paper
by databases and entries by records: The public must be able to trust that the
Ministry’s determination is legitimate. This trust used to be built into the tra-
ditional way of collecting endorsements by pen and paper, because (1) falsifying
signatures is a serious crime and (2) it is of course in the prospective party’s best
interest to take good care of these signatures. In this digital world, this is clearly
much more difficult to achieve, because online endorsement collection systems
are exposed to the same kind of cyber-attacks as Internet voting systems are.
The deployment of the DVE system in Denmark was not as smooth as de-
sired or expected. There were usability issues of endorsers who were not able
to log into the system. At least one endorser claimed to have received a confir-
mation email without having endorsed a party. The system also suffered from
security vulnerabilities, and the integration of existing data into the new digital
endorsement database turned out to be challenging. All these events can have a
negative effect on the public’s trust regarding the legitimacy of new parties.
In conclusion, party endorsement systems are closely related to Internet vot-
ing systems. The Recommendation [1] contains provisions for creating trust,
legitimacy, and integrity while protecting the secrecy of the vote. This suggests
that the procurement process of any party endorsement technology can reap
important benefits from following guidelines laid out in the 2017 version of Rec-
ommendation.
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